Blumenthal analyzes the weaponization of Kirk’s murder to stifle dissent and criminalize anti-Israel actions, exposing the pressure exerted by Zionist lobbies and U.S.
It is more certain and more consequential that Israel under Netanyahu was complicit in Oct. 7 than that Israel procured the assassination of Charlie Kirk. Max and Chris ought to be more focused on Charlie's statements made a few days after Oct. 7 in which Charlie explains what the masses now readily repeat in comments everywhere that Israel had to have been complicit in the attacks of Oct. 7.
Israel certainly knew in advance of October 7th, but murdering Kirk was a far too risky thing to do, and from what I've seen so far, he was killed by a young man for personal reasons.
Excellent analysis. Operation Gladio, assignation Aldo Moro and the 'Years of Lead' are important BUT arguably just as important -especially so for the English speaking countries is the UK's (and the City of London Corporation's) 'theories' on the 'British Way' counter insurgencies led by the infamous General Frank Kitson (“Gangs and Counter Gangs” (1960), “Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency and Peacekeeping" (1971), “Bunch of Five” (1977), etcetera) are still being deployed by the US, UK and taken to a whole new level of depravity by Israel.
Frank Kitson's influence can not be understated - "as recently as 2006 US General David Petraeus (then commander of US Central Command and coalition forces in Iraq) visited Kitson at his home in Devon, apparently for advice. "
see Declassified UK: "The general who terrorised the colonies General Sir Frank Kitson, who has died aged 97, saw the people of Kenya, Malaya and Northern Ireland as little more than laboratory rats to test his brutal military theories." (2024) https://www.declassifieduk.org/the-general-who-terrorised-the-colonies/
A quote from Frank Kitson's “Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency and Peacekeeping" (1971) states that if “the fish [terrorist] has got to be destroyed” but it proves impossible to do so “directly by rod or net” then “conceivably it might be necessary to kill the fish by polluting the water …"
and Kitson further explains
"The fish and water analogy comes of course from Mao Tse Tung, but it has been bent and extended to illustrate the required point. "
A further quote from Frank Kitson from the same book:
"An excellent example concerns the way in which the Law should work. Broadly speaking there are two possible alternatives, the first one being that the Law should be used as just another weapon in the government's arsenal, and in this case it becomes little more than a propaganda cover for the disposal of unwanted members of the public. For this to happen
efficiently, the activities of the legal services have to be tied into the war effort in as discreet a way as possible ..."
Also see History Ireland's: "Frank Kitson in Northern Ireland and the ‘British way’ of counterinsurgency" (2014) "Recent developments have focused attention on the nature of British counterinsurgency as ‘dirty war’, not only in Northern Ireland but also in several other anti-colonial struggles after World War II" https://historyireland.com/frank-kitson-northern-ireland-british-way-counterinsurgency/
Frank Kitson (then Lt Col) was notably part of "Counterinsurgency, A Symposium", April 16–20, 1962 which was held at the RAND Corporation's Washington DC office and apparently a star participant.
"The purpose of the symposium was to distill lessons and insights from past
insurgent conflicts that might help to inform and shape the U.S. involvement in Vietnam
and to foster the effective prosecution of other future counterinsurgency campaigns."
page i
As Homser further writes:
"...During five days of meetings, the participants exchanged views on a wide spectrum
of topics relating to the political, military, economic, intelligence, and psychological
measures required to defeat insurgencies. Convinced that the fundamental verities of
effective counterinsurgency policy and practice that were elucidated by the participants
remain as valid today as they were 44 years ago, rand decided to republish the symposium proceedings."
Homer lists "counterinsurgency best practices" insights from the event:
• Identify and redress the political, economic, military, and other issues fueling the
insurgency
• Gain control over and protect the population, which the counterinsurgent must
see as the prime center of gravity in any counterinsurgency conflict
• Establish an immediate permanent security presence in all built-up areas cleared
of enemy forces
• Accumulate extensive, fine-grained human and other intelligence on insurgent
plans, modes of operation, personnel, and support networks
• Avoid actions that might antagonize the population
• Convince the population that they represent the “winning side” and intend to
prevail until complete victory is secured
The participants also discussed measures to control borders (particularly effective in
Algeria), techniques for countering and conducting ambushes, and the utility of mounting “false insurgent” operations. ..." page iii and iv
Hosmer goes on "...the participants clearly shared a common view about the fundamentals of effective counterinsurgency. One of the UK participants, Lt Col Frank Kitson, later described how he was struck by the unity of outlook:
“Although we came from such widely divergent backgrounds, it was if we had all been brought up together from youth. We all spoke the same language. Probably all of us had worked out theories of counterinsurgency procedures at one time or another, which we thought were unique and original. But when we came to air them, all our ideas were essentially the same. We had another thing in common. Although we had no difficulty in making our views understood to each other, we had mostly been unable to get our respective armies to hoist in the message.”[1]
[Frank Kitson writing about the 1962 RAND Counterinsurgency, A Symposium, 15 years later in [1] Frank Kitson, Bunch of Five, London: Faber & Faber, 1977, pp. 200-201. General Sir Frank Kitson, GBE, KCB, MC, DL completed his forty-year military career as Commander in Chief, UK Land Forces 1982-1985]
The importance that RAND, Stephen T. Hosmer and their masters put on the 1962 symposium can not be understated as Hosmer concludes:
"Unfortunately, Frank Kitson’s observation about the difficulty in persuading “armies
to hoist in the message” has proven all too true in the case of U.S. and allied indigenous
military forces fighting insurgencies. Counterinsurgency best practices were frequently
ignored during much of the Vietnam War and have been less than fully followed in recent
conflicts. Hopefully, the republication of this symposium will stimulate greater interest in
their observance in the future."
page iv and v
"This report is based on the Symposium on Counterinsurgency that was held at the RAND
Corporation's Washington Office during the week of April 6, 1962. The Symposium was
sponsored by the Advanced Research Projects Agency [ARPA - now known as DEFENSE ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY (DARPA)]. Any views or conclusions contained
in this report should not be interpreted as representing the official opinion or policy of
ARPA. Counterinsurgency: A Symposium was originally published by RAND in 1963. This
new RAND edition reflects the original layout with the addition of a new foreword."
It was a great show. Everyone should listen to it. I passed it on to others. Hope they pay attention.
It is more certain and more consequential that Israel under Netanyahu was complicit in Oct. 7 than that Israel procured the assassination of Charlie Kirk. Max and Chris ought to be more focused on Charlie's statements made a few days after Oct. 7 in which Charlie explains what the masses now readily repeat in comments everywhere that Israel had to have been complicit in the attacks of Oct. 7.
Israel certainly knew in advance of October 7th, but murdering Kirk was a far too risky thing to do, and from what I've seen so far, he was killed by a young man for personal reasons.
Excellent analysis. Operation Gladio, assignation Aldo Moro and the 'Years of Lead' are important BUT arguably just as important -especially so for the English speaking countries is the UK's (and the City of London Corporation's) 'theories' on the 'British Way' counter insurgencies led by the infamous General Frank Kitson (“Gangs and Counter Gangs” (1960), “Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency and Peacekeeping" (1971), “Bunch of Five” (1977), etcetera) are still being deployed by the US, UK and taken to a whole new level of depravity by Israel.
Frank Kitson's influence can not be understated - "as recently as 2006 US General David Petraeus (then commander of US Central Command and coalition forces in Iraq) visited Kitson at his home in Devon, apparently for advice. "
see Declassified UK: "The general who terrorised the colonies General Sir Frank Kitson, who has died aged 97, saw the people of Kenya, Malaya and Northern Ireland as little more than laboratory rats to test his brutal military theories." (2024) https://www.declassifieduk.org/the-general-who-terrorised-the-colonies/
A quote from Frank Kitson's “Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency and Peacekeeping" (1971) states that if “the fish [terrorist] has got to be destroyed” but it proves impossible to do so “directly by rod or net” then “conceivably it might be necessary to kill the fish by polluting the water …"
and Kitson further explains
"The fish and water analogy comes of course from Mao Tse Tung, but it has been bent and extended to illustrate the required point. "
page 49 (32 pdf) https://ia903208.us.archive.org/25/items/KitsonFrankLowIntensityOperations.o/Kitson_Frank_-_Low_intensity_operations.o.pdf
A further quote from Frank Kitson from the same book:
"An excellent example concerns the way in which the Law should work. Broadly speaking there are two possible alternatives, the first one being that the Law should be used as just another weapon in the government's arsenal, and in this case it becomes little more than a propaganda cover for the disposal of unwanted members of the public. For this to happen
efficiently, the activities of the legal services have to be tied into the war effort in as discreet a way as possible ..."
“Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency and Peacekeeping" (1971) page 69 (page 42 on the pdf) https://ia903208.us.archive.org/25/items/KitsonFrankLowIntensityOperations.o/Kitson_Frank_-_Low_intensity_operations.o.pdf
Also see History Ireland's: "Frank Kitson in Northern Ireland and the ‘British way’ of counterinsurgency" (2014) "Recent developments have focused attention on the nature of British counterinsurgency as ‘dirty war’, not only in Northern Ireland but also in several other anti-colonial struggles after World War II" https://historyireland.com/frank-kitson-northern-ireland-british-way-counterinsurgency/
all the best.
Frank Kitson (then Lt Col) was notably part of "Counterinsurgency, A Symposium", April 16–20, 1962 which was held at the RAND Corporation's Washington DC office and apparently a star participant.
The RAND Corporation in 2006 decided to republish the above 1962 symposium with a new 2006 forward by Stephen T. Hosmer [see https://www.rand.org/pubs/authors/h/hosmer_stephen.html]
"The purpose of the symposium was to distill lessons and insights from past
insurgent conflicts that might help to inform and shape the U.S. involvement in Vietnam
and to foster the effective prosecution of other future counterinsurgency campaigns."
page i
As Homser further writes:
"...During five days of meetings, the participants exchanged views on a wide spectrum
of topics relating to the political, military, economic, intelligence, and psychological
measures required to defeat insurgencies. Convinced that the fundamental verities of
effective counterinsurgency policy and practice that were elucidated by the participants
remain as valid today as they were 44 years ago, rand decided to republish the symposium proceedings."
Homer lists "counterinsurgency best practices" insights from the event:
• Identify and redress the political, economic, military, and other issues fueling the
insurgency
• Gain control over and protect the population, which the counterinsurgent must
see as the prime center of gravity in any counterinsurgency conflict
• Establish an immediate permanent security presence in all built-up areas cleared
of enemy forces
• Accumulate extensive, fine-grained human and other intelligence on insurgent
plans, modes of operation, personnel, and support networks
• Avoid actions that might antagonize the population
• Convince the population that they represent the “winning side” and intend to
prevail until complete victory is secured
The participants also discussed measures to control borders (particularly effective in
Algeria), techniques for countering and conducting ambushes, and the utility of mounting “false insurgent” operations. ..." page iii and iv
Hosmer goes on "...the participants clearly shared a common view about the fundamentals of effective counterinsurgency. One of the UK participants, Lt Col Frank Kitson, later described how he was struck by the unity of outlook:
“Although we came from such widely divergent backgrounds, it was if we had all been brought up together from youth. We all spoke the same language. Probably all of us had worked out theories of counterinsurgency procedures at one time or another, which we thought were unique and original. But when we came to air them, all our ideas were essentially the same. We had another thing in common. Although we had no difficulty in making our views understood to each other, we had mostly been unable to get our respective armies to hoist in the message.”[1]
[Frank Kitson writing about the 1962 RAND Counterinsurgency, A Symposium, 15 years later in [1] Frank Kitson, Bunch of Five, London: Faber & Faber, 1977, pp. 200-201. General Sir Frank Kitson, GBE, KCB, MC, DL completed his forty-year military career as Commander in Chief, UK Land Forces 1982-1985]
The importance that RAND, Stephen T. Hosmer and their masters put on the 1962 symposium can not be understated as Hosmer concludes:
"Unfortunately, Frank Kitson’s observation about the difficulty in persuading “armies
to hoist in the message” has proven all too true in the case of U.S. and allied indigenous
military forces fighting insurgencies. Counterinsurgency best practices were frequently
ignored during much of the Vietnam War and have been less than fully followed in recent
conflicts. Hopefully, the republication of this symposium will stimulate greater interest in
their observance in the future."
page iv and v
"This report is based on the Symposium on Counterinsurgency that was held at the RAND
Corporation's Washington Office during the week of April 6, 1962. The Symposium was
sponsored by the Advanced Research Projects Agency [ARPA - now known as DEFENSE ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY (DARPA)]. Any views or conclusions contained
in this report should not be interpreted as representing the official opinion or policy of
ARPA. Counterinsurgency: A Symposium was originally published by RAND in 1963. This
new RAND edition reflects the original layout with the addition of a new foreword."
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/reports/2006/R412-1.pdf